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CLASS ACTIONS IN RELATION TO CROSS-BORDER POLLUTION 
A Dutch Perspective
Prof. Dr. Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira 
(University of Amsterdam/ 
European University Institute, Florence)
f. Introduction
It seems necessary, right from the outset, to redefine the topic as introduced 
in the title. Seen from a comparative point of view, this title suggests only 
one of the types of answers given by legal systems to an underlying 
question, and an answer which does not fit the Dutch situation at all. To put 
it bluntly, in the technical sense there are no class actions in Dutch law, at 
least no actions comparable with the type of action as indicated under Rule 
23 of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other common law 
systems.
In order to find an answer in the Dutch legal system to the question which I 
think is implicit in the title of the topic, we have to resort to a comparative 
rephrasing of the question.
When we are trying to define the area and boundaries of the topic, there are 
two main dimensions to keep in mind:
1. The aggregation of a certain number of persons into a group which is 



























































































combination of a few persons on the one hand to permanent association 
in the form of legal entities such as associations, foundations and trusts, 
etc.; and
2. the (diffuse) rights or interests for which these aggregations are prepared 
or designed to litigate; personal, individual interests and rights, collective 
or group rights, the general interest, and everything which lies between 
these extremes.
As far as these rights and interests are concerned, in this report I will restrict 
myself as much as possible to an area which, conceptually, is in itself not 
very clear at all: environmental interests and rights. It is, however, not 
possible to refrain from some remarks and explanations concerning more 
general issues, as Dutch law does not always distinguish between 
environmental values and rights and interests at large.
Thus, I propose to deal with group actions in civil procedure concerning 
environmental issues according to Dutch law and practice, in the hope that 
this more abstract tertium comparationis will enable thus to compare the 
phenomena, their legal design, their function, their peculiarities, in different 
legal systems, and to look for improvements.
The loose description just given does not necessarily rule out traditional 
ways in which courts are used such as the test-case which formally involves 
only one claimant and one defendant but which can be more or less 
'constructed' with a view to its spill-over effect through the 'added value' 
("meerwaarde") which each decision derives from being a precedent in a 
flow or system of court decisions . Neither does it conceptually extradite 
joinder as an associational device in civil litigation, but these more
l
Cf. d'Oliveira, De meerwaarde van rcchterlijke uitsprakcn (Arrêts de règlement en 



























































































traditional groupings will receive only little attention in this paper.
Before embarking upon the treatment of group actions in Dutch civil
procedure, I want to point out that, as concerns functions, two elements
play a role in different degrees: on the one hand, a kind of neutral need for
procedural efficiency in handling cases which involve a lot of parties; and
on the other, the adequate treatment of non-individual interests and rights:
the general or public interest, which, in traditional continental thinking is
the domain reserved for the state and its organs and institutions. Let us say
the handling of the claims of the victims and their families of an airplane
disaster, on the one hand, and those of an environmental group which is
systematically attacking licences to pollute the Waddensea or to build
nuclear plants, on the other. The first is an example in which the emphasis
lays on efficiency in dealing with the matter: the many claims arising out of
the disaster should — notwithstanding individual variations -- be dealt with
in such a way as not to repeat common elements in each and every claim:
here streamlining is the key word. Institutional arrangements may vary
from joinder to multi-district litigation which is becoming more and more
2
successful, doing even better quantitatively than class actions .
On the other hand, the defence of the Waddensea against pollution is more 
concerned with the general interest, which is another word for politics, or 
rather a word which is available for contestation between citizens and 
governments. We have become aware that neither has a monopoly to define 
the general interest, and one of the places were the power to define the 
content of the general interest is at stake is precisely the group action in civil 
and administrative procedure. Thus, where the administration may think it 
2
See B. Garth, General Report, Group Action: Class Actions, Public Interest Actions, or 
Organisation actions and Parens patriae Jurisdiction, Xlllth International Congress of 




























































































proper not to pursue a specific matter, a public interest group may pick it up 
because it has a different view from the government on the implications of 
the public interests.
2. Structure of the report
In the last decade, the topic of safeguarding diffuse and collective interest
3
has drawn a lot of attention, also in the Netherlands . The present author
4
has written several Dutch reports for comparative purposes , on which this 
paper will draw in some respects, and to which 1 refer for the more general 
subjective and objective aspects of groups rights and collective interests in 
civil litigation.
In this report the focus will be on the most important international aspects of 
(civil) litigation by groups for diffuse environmental rights and interests. In 
the following paragraphs I will first deal with the specifics of the 
international scene: international jurisdiction including summary
3
See for the literature Onrechtmatige Daad (loose leaf) II (van Nispen), nr. 219a.
See H.U. Jessurun d'Oliveira, Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in 
Civil Litigation, national report for the Netherlands for the VHth International Congress 
on Procedural Law, Würzburg September 1983, NILR 1983, pp. 161-187, also in: 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Procesrecht (eds), Effectieve Rechtsbescherming en 
constitutionele contrôle (1984), pp. 157-182 (The general report Mauro Cappelletti-Bryant 
Garth, Finding an Appropriate Compromise: A Comparative Study of Individualistic Models and 
Group Rights in Civil Procedure, was published in Civil Justice Quarterly 1983, pp. 111-147); 
idem, Group Actions in Civil Procedure, National Report, published in E.H. Hondius, 
G.J.W. Steenhoff (eds), Netherlands Reports to the Thirteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, Montreal 1990 (1990), pp. 135-148; see also idem, Bestrijding van 
internationale milieu-criminaliteit. Een slachtofferperspektief, Recht en Kritiek 1984, pp. 
366-376, and idem, Ch. 7.1 and 7.2 (international private and international public law) in: 





























































































proceedings (3); locus standi (4); the choice of the applicable law in 
transboundary pollution cases (5); recognition and enforcement of judgment 
(6), and finally some selected issues (7), notably the status of permits in the 




By far the most important international instrument for the Netherlands
concerning jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters is the Brussels
5
Convention 1968 (EEX) . This Convention, which not only gives direct rules 
of jurisdiction but also simplifies recognition and enforcements of 
judgments regularly produced in the Member States without being a EEC 
legislative act in the narrow sense, is nevertheless based on art. 220 EC 
Treaty which asks for measures to simplify formalities in recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.
Central to the safeguarding of environmental rights and interests are art. 
5(3) EEX and art. 24 EEX. Which judges are available in transboundary 
pollution cases? If these cases amount to torts the answer is to be found in 
art. 5(3) EEX; whereas provisional measures may also be taken by the judge 
indicated in art. 24 EEX.
Convention on jurisdiction and Enforcement of judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 




























































































3.1.1. Art 5(3) and the European Court of Justice
According to Art 5(3), a person domiciled in a Contracting State may be 
sued
"3. In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts of 
the place where the harmful event occurred."
Although originally the European Court of Justice has defined the relation
between the general basis for jurisdiction of art. 2 (at the domicile of the
defendant in a Contracting State) and the special jurisdiction of e.g. art. 5(3)
as juxtaposition, in later judgments it stated that these special rules on
jurisdiction should be seen as deviations from the actor sequitur mi-principle
and it derived from this relationship the conclusion that the deviating
6
provisions should be construed narrowly .
It is to be seen which constrictions the European Court had in mind, and 
especially whether it intended to deviate from its earlier liberal decisions 
concerning the demarcation lines with other provisions of the Convention; it 
is clear, however, that it intended not to bid farewell to the broad 
construction, in the case itself, of the phrase "matters relating to tort delict or 
quasi-delict", as it excluded only liability relating to a contract (which is the 
subject matter of art. 5(1)) . 1 submit that the European Court has not come 
back either from its broad interpretation of the phrase, so extremely im­
portant in environmental matters, "place where the harmful event occurred" 
8
in the Reinwater case . This was one of the very first cases brought before 
6
See ECJ, 27 Sept. 1988, case 189/87, NJ 1990,425 note by J.C. Schultsz.
7
EC], 27 Sept. 1988, case 189/87 (Kalfelis v. Schroder, Miinchmeyer, Hengst & Co.), NJ 
1990,425 note by J.C. Schultsz.
8




























































































the European Court of Justice concerning the Brussels Convention.
The facts of the case are well-known and can be summarized as follows in
9
the words of O'Malley and Leyton
The allegation was that the French mine-owners were discharging 
chlorides into the Rhine, so polluting it that Bier's horticulture 
business in Holland was put to considerable expense to limit the 
damage to its crops. The horticulturalists, supported by the 
Reinwater Foundation (whose sisiphean task is to promote the 
puritv of the water of the Rhine) brought an action against the 
French mine-owners in the court at Rotterdam. The defendants 
objected to the jurisdiction of the Dutch court and were successful at 
first instance on the grounds that the event that had caused the 
damage could only be the discharge of the polluting salts into the 
Rhine, and that that had taken place within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the French courts. Relying on art. 5(3), the plaintiffs 
appealed to the Gerechtshof in the Hague, which referred the ques­
tion of the interpretation of "the place where the harmful event
10
occurred" to the European Court of Justice. (...) .
The Court ruled, in the event, in the following way:
"Where the place of the happening of the event which may give rise 
to liability in tort, delict, or quasi-delict and the place where that 
event results in damage are not identical, the expression "place 
where the harmful event occurred", in art. 5(3) ... must be 
understood as being intended to cover both the place where the 
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it.
The result is that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the 
plaintiff, either in the courts for the place where the damage 
occurred or in the courts for the place of the event which gives rise 
to and is at the origin of that damage."
1976,1735.
9
European Civil Practice (1989), p. 425.
10
That this case, concerning the locus delicti came from litigation in the Netherlands is no 
accident, for there does not exist, under Dutch municipal law, a jurisdictional rule 
based on this locus delicti: the only grounds therefore was to be found in art. 5(3). 
Reinwater had deliberately waited for the coming into force of the Brussels Convention 




























































































The reasons for this autonomous interpretation, independent from the way
in which Member States deal with the question of localizing harmful events
have primarily to do with a procedural perspective, and less with e.g., a
principle to protect victims or weaker parties. Its efficiency in terms of
gathering evidence in various ways, the place of the judge vis-à-vis the
relevant facts and parties etc. counts in the first place. As it is impossible to
prefer a priori one of the two or more potential places — locus actus, locus or
loci damni — the European Court gives them equal weight. Certainly, it could
have decided that the judge should localize on an ad hoc efficiency basis,
but that would have created a lot of uncertainty. So in the end the decision is
left in the hands of the plaintiff, who, of course, will bear in mind that the
locus actus will regularly coincide with the forum rei of art. 2, and that
generally the only additional forum will be the forum of the locus damni,
which, in turn, will normally coincide with the forum actoris. In effect, then,
the autonomous interpretation given by the European Court in the
Reinwater case to "the place where the harmful event occurred" works in
favour of the plaintiffs, although this is not what the Court said to have in- 
11
tended .
In cases of transboundary pollution — explicitly mentioned by the Court — 
the legal concept of locus delicti has exploded into useful fragments which 
can each found jurisdiction. Thus, in the Reinwater case plaintiffs all along 
the river Rhine can sue either at Mulhouse (locus actus) or at their respective
11
The narrowing down of the heads of jurisdiction under art. 5(3) can be detected 
however in ECJ, 11 Jan. 1990, case C220/88 (Dumez France S.A. v. Hessische 
Landesbank), where it was decided that the jurisdiction rule of art. 5(3) may not be 
interpreted in such a way that a plaintiff, alleging to have suffered damage as a 
consequence of damage incurred by other persons, who are direct victims of the 
harmful event, can summon the originators of this event before the courts of the place 



























































































places where the damage occurs .
The choice of court -- which in some quarters is called depreciatorily forum- 
13
shopping -- by the plaintiff will depend on many factors: the law to be 
declared applicable by the court, the substantive and procedural advantages 
and disadvantages of this law, the presumed favourable or unfavourable 
bias of the Court towards plaintiff or defendant, the prospects for execution 
at the locus actus or elsewhere, die.
3.1.2. Art. 5(3) and the Dutch courts
National courts, including the Dutch ones, have regularly applied art. 5(3) 
as interpreted by the European Court of Justice, in environmental litigation. 
Two important cases merit special attention, as they both have had to solve 
complex problems of litigation in the area of transboundary pollution, 
a. Hoge Raad 14 April 1989, NJ 1990, nr 712 (Benckiser) notes by C.J.H. 
Brunner and J.C. Schultsz.
A German chemical industry experiences enormous difficulties in disposing 
of large amounts of gypsum waste containing huge proportions of toxic 
cyanides. Export to the GDR proved too expensive, export to other countries 
as Belgium and France too problematic in terms of administrative 
authorization. So Benckiser resorted to fraud and illegal export to the 
Netherlands by selling the toxic waste to a mala fide Dutch buyer, who
12
See on the ECJ 21/76 case D.S. 1977, p. 613, note Droz, Rev. Crit. 1977, 563, note Bourel, 
Clunet 1977, p. 728, note Huet; Rev. fur. Env. 1977. p. 323 note Kiss; d'Oliveira, La 
pollution du Rhin et le droit international privé, in Hueting-van der Veen-Kiss- 
d'Oliveira, Rhine Pollution/lM pollution du Rhin 1978, pp. 81-127.
13
Cf. Fritz Juenger, Forum Shopping, Rabelsz 1982, p. 708; idem, Forum Shopping, 
Domestic and International, Tulane Law Rev. 1989, pp. 553-574; K. Siehr, "Forum 






























































































forged expert reports analysing the gypsum and dumped the substances in
14
bulk in some eight sites in the Netherlands .
The State and two firms on whose sites the waste had fraudulently been 
dumped asked in summary proceedings that defendants (both the Dutch 
firm, its director, and Benckiser) remove, this time legally, the toxic waste 
from the dumping sites and from Dutch territory (the State). The President 
of the District Court Dordrecht founded his jurisdiction on art. 5(3),
"because according to the allegations of the plaintiffs the harmful 
effects of the tort which has been committed — the environmental 
pollution caused by the deposit of the gypsum mountains -- 
manifest themselves in the Netherlands."
The State's claim was dismissed by the President for reasons derived from
municipal law, but the claims of the other plaintiffs were granted. The State
and Benckiser appealed. Concerning its jurisdiction the Appeal Court
invoked not the Brussels Convention, but two municipal provisions: arts.
289 j°, art. 126(3) and (5)C.C.Pr. The first provision is specifically designed
for summary proceedings. It is not clear beyond doubt what the Appeal 
15
Court had in mind . If it referred tacitly to art. 24 EEX concerning 
"provisional, including protective measures as may be available under the 
law of that State" which clearly refers back to the municipal law of the State 
of the court involved, one may question this selection as the petition by the 
Dutch state was not necessarily aimed at interim relief: the removal from
14
As Dutch producers of wastes, including local authorities resort to illegal exports to 
Belgium. Cf. De Volkskrant 18 May 1991.
15
Cf. G. Betlem, Grensoverschrijdend handhaven, De Benckiser-zaak en het EEG- 
Executieverdrag (Transtxiundary enforcement, the Benckiser-case and the Brussels 
Convention), in: van Buuren-Betlem-Ijlstra (eds), Milieurecht in stelling (1990), pp. 158- 




























































































Dutch territory was seen as the end of the matter, it concerned the substance 
of the matter.
Before the Dutch Supreme Court this jurisdictional issue was not raised any 
more, so that the Hoge Raad was precluded from deciding it or asking a 
preliminary ruling16. Other aspects of the Benckiser-case will be discussed 
in the next paragraphs.
b. A less well-known case, but as interesting as Benckiser, and certainly of
more recent date, is Reinwater cs vs. Sopar, District Court Middelburg, 8 
17
March 1991 . Three environmental foundations ("Stichtingen") and one
environmental Association whose members, in turn, were environmental
foundations and associations, asked in summary proceedings before the
President of the District Court of Middelburg for injunctive relief against a
Belgian chemical and pharmaceutical industry. This industry, with a plant
just across the Belgian-Dutch border on the transboundary canal between 
18
Ghent and Terneuzen discharged large quantities of waste water, 
contaminated with PACs (polyclycic aromatic carbons), which are con­
sidered to be carcinogenic and are not easily degradable. As these PACs 
were transported through the canal from Belgium to the Netherlands and in
16
Betlcm, l.c. (previous note) argues, referring to EC] 16 Dec. 1980, case 814/79 
(Netherlands State v. Hiiffer), NJ 1982, nt J.C.S., Jur. 1980, 3807, that the State's claim 
would not fall under art. 5(3) as it did not concern a civil or commercial matter', 
although art. 1401 Civil Code (the general provision on torts) was seen as the 
foundation of the claim to remove the toxic waste, i.e., for restitutio in integrum. As this 
issue lies at the margin of our topic, 1 will leave the discussion of it aside.
17
Not yet published. Appeal is pending.
18
See for the stagnating negotiations between Belgium and the Netherlands concerning 
the pollution of the transboundary water courses (including the river Meuse), letter of 





























































































this way polluted Dutch surface waters the Dutch environmentalists asked 
the president for an injunction to stop the discharges on pains of a heayy 
periodic fine; in case of non-compliance this fine is payable to the plaintiffs. 
As to his jurisdiction the President considered that he had the power to 
decide the case under art. 5(3) EEX, "as Reinwater cs alleged that the illegal 
discharges by Sopar caused damages also in the Dutch part of the Canal 
Ghent-Terneuzen and in the Westerscheldt, and this is sufficient to assume 
this jurisdiction".
This decision is clearly in line with the Reinwater case, decided by the 
European Court of Justice in 1976, on a fact-law pattern which is in many 
respects comparable. I will return to some of its issues in the next 
paragraphs: issues of standing, the significance of authorizations, the 
injunction which has to be carried out in another country than that of the 
forum. One of the differences with the mentioned precedent is the fact that 
Sopar concerns summary proceedings whereas the Reinwater case does not. 
This raises the problem whether it is not rather art. 24 EEX on which 
jurisdiction has to be based than art. 5(3) EEX.
3.1.3. Art. 24 EEX
Art. 24 EEX allows applications to be made for provisional, including
protective, measures to the Courts of a Contracting State even if the courts of
another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
These measures must be available under the lex fori. It is generally accepted
that the summary proceedings of the Dutch kort geding are to be considered
19
as leading to provisional measures in the sense of art. 24 EEX , although in





























































































the vast majority of cases there is no follow-up with a "bodemprocedure”, 
litigation concerning the substance of the matter, either in the same or in an­
other court. Art. 24 EEX is of course not preemptive in the sense that it does 
not prohibit the application of provisional measures by the judge who is 
dealing with the substance of the matter. Art. 24 gives an extra opportunity 
to plaintiffs to safeguard their position and does not withdraw such 
opportunity to defend their position before the court which has power to 
decide the substance of the case.
Dutch courts have sometimes been reluctant to grant interim relief in 
international cases, especially if the court order had to be carried out in 
another (Member) State.
An example is Pres. District Court Middelburg, 24 April 1987, NJ 
1989, 744 with note J.C. Schultsz; Milieu en Recht 1987, p. 693, with 
note J.H. Jans.
Application by Dutch environmentalist groups to close down the nuclear
plant in Doel (Belgium). As it was not clear whether art. 5(3) also concerns
threatened wrongs as in this case and not only wrongs which have already
'occurred', we are to say the least also in the zone of art. 24 EEX and its
protective measures. Although the President based himself 'provisionally'
on art. 24 EEX he denied the request because he felt that an order enjoining
a foreign domiciled party to act in another Member State would lack
20
effectivity and was in a way ultra vires . According to Dutch municipal law 
at least all those Dutch courts have jurisdiction for provisional measures 
which would have jurisdiction under the other provisions of the
20 !





























































































Convention; furthermore, it would be in the spirit of the Convention to
allow the (Dutch) court of the place were effect is to be given to the court or-
21
der to issue interim relief under the Convention . In the nuclear plant case 
the district court of Middelburg would have had jurisdiction under art. 5(3) 
EEX as judge of the (potential) locus damni.
In Benckiser the Germany-domiciled German defendant was bound by the 
Dutch court order to act in the Netherlands. This situation is less 
controversial than the fact-pattern in which the court order obliges a party 
to act outside the jurisdiction, and this issue forms the object of the next 
subparagraph.
3.2. Cross-border injunctions
As we have seen, the President of the Middelburg District Courts had grave 
doubts about his power to grant interim relief to plaintiffs in the form of 
court orders to be complied with in another country.
This ’enlightened self-restraint' out of fear to be seen as a splendid torch
bearer of Weltjudikatur seems to be unfounded, precisely in the context of
the Brussels Convention. Under certain conditions which have been devel-
22
oped in the case law of the European Court of Justice , injunctive measures 
are judgments and as such enjoy the regime of the Convention which tends 
to facilitate the free movement of judgments within the European 
Community according to title III EEX.
Interlocutory orders issued by the Court before which the substantive case is
21
Cf. Verheul, Rechtsmacht I, par. Ill 175.





























































































pending may be recognized and enforced in other Member States 
according to title 111 of the Convention, and the same is true for art. 24 mea­
sures. This exercise of judicial jurisdiction is allowed under public 
international law, and it depends on municipal law if indeed the national 
judge has under his own law — to which art. 24 refers -- the power to bind 
parties to act outside the territory. This is the case under Dutch law.
In a recent case, the Hoge Raad has explicitly stated that Dutch courts have 
these powers, not only in ordinary proceedings, but also in "kort geding".
In a case concerning industrial property rights under the Benelux 
Merkenwet, the Dutch Supreme Court stated (24 November 1989), R.v.d. W. 
1989, 267 (Interlas) explicitly:
"Unless something different follows from law, the nature of the 
obligation or from a legal act, the person who is obliged towards 
another to give something, to do or to refrain from doing something 
will be condemned by the judge upon demand of the person 
entitled to act accordingly. Generally speaking there is no reason to 
assume that there is no room for such an order if it concerns an 
obligation — in the event an obligation according to foreign law -- 
that has to be complied with outside the Netherlands. A more 
restrictive view (...) finds no support in law, and would lead to the 
undesirable result in a time of increasing international contacts, that, 
in the case of wrongs with an international character -- such as 
infringement of intellectual property rights and unlawful compe­
tition in different countries or transboundary pollution of the 
environment -- the Dutch victim could be forced to apply to the 
courts of each and every country concerned."
This is a clear and unambiguous statement by the Hoge Raad diametrically 
opposed to the consideration of the Middelburg president in the nuclear 
plant case. It allows, for instance, to order all those firms and industries who 
pollute the river Rhine along its Swiss, French, German and Dutch banks to
23




























































































refrain from doing so, by one and the same Dutch court order . It is not re­
stricting itself to the EEX or other Conventional arrangements facilitating 
"extraterritorial" court orders. In cases where the efficacy of these 
transboundary injunctions may seem less than satisfactory, given the way in 
which the foreign court deals with recognition and enforcement, it should 
be borne in mind that non-compliance by the defendant will result in the 
dwangsom becoming due, and this fine may be collected under existing con­
ventions wherever assets of the defendant may be found. Only where this 
residuary efficacy of the judgment is lacking a judge may come to the 
conclusion that an extraterritorial injunction is what the French call a 'coup 
d’épée dans l'eau', and refrain from giving such an order.
3.3. Lugano
For the sake of completeness I mention here, that the EEX, to which Spain
and Portugal acceded on the basis of the Convention of San Sebastian, 
25
concluded on 26 May 1989 , has been flanked by the so-called Parallel
~26
Convention of Lugano of 16 September 1988 with the EFTA countries . As 
to the provisions treated above, no relevant discrepancies between EEX and 
Lugano are to be noticed. The effect of the coming into force of the 
Conventions first mentioned will be the expansion of the territory in which
24
The statement that 'Dutch courts do not have jurisdiction to authorise the taking of 
provisional measures outside the Netherlands' (in O'Malley-Leyton, European Civil 
Practice (1989), p. 1444) if it has ever been a true description of Dutch law, has already 
become obsolete in the light of the statement of the Hoge Raad in Interlas.
25
JO, EC 30 October 1989, L.285.
26
Cf. Droz, La Convention de Lugano parallèle à la Convention de Bruxelles, Rev. Crit. 
1989, p. 1-51, and the literature mentioned by Vlas, Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (loose 





























































































on the basis of uniform rules of jurisdiction the free movement of judgments 
will be guaranteed.
3.4. Council of Europe Draft Convention on Damage resulting from Activities
27
Dangerous to the Environment
The above-mentioned draft contains articles on jurisdiction, proceedings 
and recognition and enforcement.
In this section I mention briefly art. 21 concerning jurisdiction. This article 
provides for jurisdiction in state parties at the Court of the locus damni and 
the locus actus whenever compensation is sought; furthermore the forum rei 
is available.
Actions for access to information have to be brought exclusively in the 
courts of the place where the defendant has its habitual residence or where 
the dangerous activity is conducted. This provision makes it necessary, if 
the action is brought at the court of the locus damni, to stay proceedings, 
according to art. 24, until one of the other courts has decided on access to 
information necessary for the proceedings in the first court. I doubt the 
efficiency of this narrow provision.
There is a tentative draft rule between brackets on the actions brought by
28
organizations under art. 20 of the Convention . According to this draft 
provision these actions may only be brought within a State party before the 
judge or administrative authorities of the defendants' habitual residence or 
where he carries out the dangerous activity. This would rule out the forum 
of the locus damni.
27






























































































Although one can see the logic of this restriction, as public interest 
organizations may not sue for damages under this draft Convention, and 
thus the place of the damage loses weight as grounds for jurisdiction, never­
theless the wisdom of excluding this court can be challenged. In the first 
place the provision would not be in line with the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions. Although Art. 57 of the Brussels Convention accepts 
deviations from its rules by later Conventions on special subjects, it is not 
very elegant to allow such a derogation in this matter. Neither is it useful or 
necessary. Injunctions of the kind described in art. 20 can be given also by 
the judge or administrative authority of the locus damni; and this judge may 
be more inclined to do so than the judge of the origin of the damage caused 
by the dangerous activities. My conclusion is that art. 21 has to be 
remodelled and streamlined and brought into line with the Brussels 
Convention arts. 5(3) and 24.
4. Locus standi
A very important, second hurdle to be taken consists of the answer given to 
the crucial question of standing. Will organisations be allowed to act not 
only in their (narrowly considered) own, individual interest, but also in the 
interest of others or the community at large? "Point d'intérêt, point d'action" 
is the famous catch-phrase, but, as all slogans do, it may, in the course of 
time and under the influence of new developments change in meaning. The 
Dutch code of civil procedure, as other such continental codes is in tune 
with the time in which it was created, imbued with liberal-individualistic 





























































































Nowadays this atomistic view has been making place for a more socialized 
view of rights and interests: on the one hand the exercise of individual, 
exclusive rights is checked in many different ways by considerations of the 
well-being and interests of others and society as a whole; on the other, there 
exists strong pressure to accept that diffuse or collective rights and interests 
may be represented by members of the group involved and even by 
aggregations of persons who are involved in the same way as other 
members of society. Here, it may seem clear, is room for clashes with 
representational democracy and its implications, for clashes between law 
and politics, that is for constitutional tensions.
In this area there are notable developments in Dutch procedural law. Even
in the seventies, the Reinwater Foundation in its battle against the pollution
of the Rhine, was denied standing against the Mines de Potasse d'Alsace.
The district court Rotterdam did not receive Reinwater in its claim to see the
discharge of the chlorides declared a tort and the damage accordingly re-
29
paired, as it was presumed not to have an interest of its own . As 
Reinwater had foreseen this judicial reaction or reflex, although it had 
hoped for a more activist role of the court, it had sought the alliance of some 
Westland horticulturalists (in turn backed by their own organisations) who 
undoubtedly had locus standi in iudicio. In this way, the proceedings became 
extremely shadowy, as the real actors stayed outside and in court only 
willing puppets could be seen as plaintiffs. Of course, the greenhouse 
owners had the required personal-individual interests, but they would 
never have engaged in this litigation but for the initiative and financial






























































































backing of Reinwater and the horticultural organisations.
A system of procedural law which relies on such fakes and artificial set-ups 
must eventually adapt itself to the measures of organisational litigation 
concerning diffuse interests and group rights. There are new tendencies to 
be noted in both case law and legislation.
4.1. Case law
"What at first was barred from the court room as constitutionally 
impermissible interference -- such diffuse or public interests were 
supposed to be guarded by the representational democracy — is
30
gradually considered to be acceptable civic spirit."
31
This statement from my above-mentioned report was empirically 
investigated in an article published in 1985. On the basis of a study of the 
case law, the author, Mr. van Mierlo, came to the conclusion that my 
statement was "premature". "A few incidental judgments are not enough to 
be able to ... support the assertion.... It is to be doubted whether judges now 
assess their constitutional position differently." An exception may be made, 
according to the author, for rulings by the President of the Amsterdam 
Court, but this case law meets with resistance, as is evident from a ruling by 
the Amsterdam Appeals Court (8 November 1984), in which it denied ex 
officio appellants (including a number of environmental organisations) locus 
standi.
Prediction is not a matter for everyone: shortly after, the Hoge Raad, in a 
breakthrough judgment in the same case, gave environmental organisations
30
Note 4 (1983), p. 169.
31





























































































standing - as had the President in summary proceedings: HR 27 June 1986,
32
Nederlandse Jurisprudence 1987, 743 .
A nation-wide, a provincial and a local environmental organisation called in 
summary proceedings for the municipality of Amsterdam to be stopped 
from dumping polluted mud from the Amsterdam canals in a neighbouring 
lake, the Nieuwe Meer, specifically for lack of permission for such dumping. 
The President of the Court had taken delivery of the request but rejected it: 
the Appeals Court ex officio decided inadmissibility for lack of specific 
interest of the organisations' own. The Hoge Raad squashed this and 
declared that the three environmental organisations were indeed admissible 
in their request.
33
The Hoge Raad sets this out as follows :
"The complaints are rightly proposed. The starting point should 
certainly be that the mere description of the objective of a legal 
person does not yet entitle it to submit a petition to the civil judge 
regarding interference with the interest which, according to the 
description, it has undertaken to defend, but exceptions are 
conceivable. Such an exception occurs here.
In the first place, the interests affected in a petition like the present 
one - dealing essentially with securing a ban on further interference 
with the environment - lend themselves to "grouping", as has been 
brought out in the submissions before the Court by the environment 
associations; if there were no such possibility of grouping, then ef­
fective legal protection against threatened interference with these 
interests could be not inconsiderably hampered, since as a rule they 
affect large groups of citizens together, while the consequences of 
any interference for any one of these citizens are very hard to
Commentaries on this important judgment in inter alia: J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Ars Acqui 
1986, p. 638; M.A. Heldeweg en F.S. Fernhout, Nederlands Juristenblad 1986, p. 1203; 
W.H. Heemskerk, Nederlandse Jurisprudent 1987, no. 753; P. Kottenhagen-Edzes, Tijd- 
schrift voor Milieu-aansprakelijkheid 1987, pp. 34-40; L. Damen, Collectieven als 
procespartij in het milieurecht: een alledaagse zaak, in Collectieve actie in het recht, Ars 































































































It should further be noted that - by contrast with what the Court 
obviously assumed - the interests grouped here belong to the kind 
that falls under the protection that Art. 1401 BW is intended to offer; 
this also applies to the interest that also plays a role in the case in 
point: not, through actions carried out without permission like those 
the environmentalist associations accuse the municipality of, to be 
deprived of the possibility - to be dealt with in the next paragraph - 
of defending the above-mentioned interests in good time in 
licensing proceedings under the General Environmental Provisions 
Act, using the guarantees it offers.
In the second place, it is of importance that the General 
Environmental Provisions Act, applicable to permissions to be 
applied for under the Surface Waters Pollution Act, lays it down as 
far as entitlement to complaint and appeal is concerned not only 
that this is in principle due to "everyone" (though appeal is limited 
to those who had already made a complaint or had been unable to 
do so), but also explicitly indicates (Art. 79) that "in respect of 
private law organisations, the interests for which they have been 
called into being shall be regarded as their interests". With this 
acceptance of associations such as the ones in question here into the 
administrative phase - which acceptance, having regard also to the 
parliamentary genesis of the act, can be considered as unrestricted - 
it would as far as standing in proceedings about permission is 
concerned, be incompatible for it to be impossible for the same 
associations to act by summary procedure against conduct which 
they regard as wrongly taking place without permission and which 
could in principle lead to interference with the interests which the 
association, according to the description of its objectives, defends. 
This also means that it would not be appropriate in a case like the 
present one to require additional conditions for admissibility, such 
as for instance on representativity or actual activities."
Although the Hoge Raad has not thrown the door right open for interest 
organisations to appear in civil actions — the decision is presented as an 
exception to the main rule that the mere enshrinement of the objectives of a 
legal person in its articles does not necessarily entitle it to go to law — broad 
room has nevertheless been left for private (legal) persons interested in 
collective and general interests. In brief, the dimensions of this judgment 




























































































- The Hoge Raad accepts the development in the case law of the lower
courts: many judgments by Presidents of tribunals had preceded it, and 
as frequently occurs Appeal Courts had been more cautious; in this case 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal had even denied standing ex officio, 
without the defendant having applied for this.
- Besides the description of objectives in the statutes of organisations, it is
of prime importance that the interests involved in the demand lend 
34
themselves to "grouping" . In the case in point what is involved is a
prohibition on further pollution of the environment. Efficient legal
protection would be lacking if all individuals with an interest in
opposing environmental pollution had to decide to take action
separately. Where large groups of citizens are in the same boat, it is
35
efficient for their diffuse interests to be defended by clubs . 
Cumulative consequences of environmental pollution are easier to show 
than the sometimes minuscule effects in an individual case where fre­
quently, .moreover, a "de minimis non curat praetor” idea takes primacy; 
36
the same goes for the civis .
- The interests served are protected by civil law, specifically by Art. 1401 of
the Dutch Civil Code (unlawful act). The case in point concerned not 
only the interest in opposing further detriment to the environment, but 
also the interest in being able to act effectively on behalf of this interest
34
Cf. the title of the dissertation by legal sociologist C.A. Groenendijk, Bundeling van 
belangen bij de burgetiijkc rcehtcr (1981) (Grouping of interests in civil litigation).
35
The Hoge Raad speaks fairly systematically about "associations”; in my view the same 
applies to foundations and to other legal persons. It merits attention that in this 
landmark case two out of the three legal persons were in fact not 'associations' but 
foundations.
36




























































































in administrative proceedings. A remarkable link is thus made between 
civil law and administrative law.
- In assessing admissibility, what counts is not the usefulness of the 
grouping of interests for effective legal protection, but also the position 
that the legal persons in question possesses in administrative law. Now, 
the general law on environmental proceedings, and Art. 79 of the 
General Environmental Principles Act even states that
"in respect of private law organisations, the interests for which 
they have been called into being shall be regarded as their 
interests."
But then, according to the Hoge Raad, they cannot be given a less 
favourable position in private law; they should therefore also have 
access to the judge in summary proceedings.
- Having regard to this status of Elckerlyc, "every man" in Dutch 
administrative environmental law, there is no need to postulate such 
additional demands as are mentioned in the literature, such as 
representativity, or actual activities, in order to be able to decide posi­
tively on admissibility. These points may perhaps play a role in other 
areas than environment protection.
I wish to make a couple of comments on this important judgment. There is a 
normative aspect concealed in the criterion of the usefulness of the 
grouping of interests. Collectivization must not only be technically possible 
but also acceptable from the viewpoint of the legal system, as the judge 
perceives it. Thus, the Hoge Raad had shortly before rejected the 
admissibility of the Foundation ZOROT (Zonder Recht Of Titel [without 




























































































guaranteeing the anonymity of those interested in the use of accommodation
in the premises occupied by them, making the securing of clearance orders
by owners and others considerably harder, particularly through the Hoge 
38
Raad's case law . The disputes in the area of civil procedural law against
(speculative) owners of immovable property and the squatters (or squatters’
movement) have in part been settled by new legislation: the Act on Empty
Premises, which now possesses a section, which will not come into force, on
fair distribution of living accommodation in premises standing empty (for
speculative reasons), and a section that has as a matter of fact come into
force, making it easy to secure orders against anonymous defendants and
defendants who have not appeared; this is a blatant distortion of the law of
civil procedure and of the structure of the Act on Empty Premises, which I 
39
predicted in 1983 . The interest of house owners lends itself to bringing 
together the interests of the other side. Squatters are not permitted to come 
together as plaintiffs in a foundation, but they have by law to put up with 
being brought together as defendants, packed up and thrown out. If this is 
compared with the legally prescribed nature of the "association of flat 
owners" (Art. 876 of the Dutch Civil Code), it can be seen that technically 
there is nothing in the way of bringing together rights and interests in 
accommodation, but that in the case of the squatters ideological and political
squatters . One of the interests pursued by this Foundation was
Hoge Raad, 5 October 1984, Nederlandse Jurisprudents 1985, no. 445, note by W.L. 
Haardt.
38
See, e.g., Hoge Raad, 2 November 1979, Nederlandse Jurisprudents 1980, p. 154; see also 
d'Oliveira, loc. cit. (note 4), pp. 173-174.
39 d'Oliveira, op. cit., p. 176. On 1 January 1987 Art. 18 of the Act on Empty Premises on 




























































































objections are felt: plainly, there are interests felt not to deserve any 
grouping - however technically feasible.
A second observation is that the Reinwater Foundation, which along with
three market-gardening legal persons (with market-gardeners organisations
in the background) brought a civil action against the French potassium
mines, would in all probability have been declared admissible ten years
later. It was excluded from the proceedings for lack of a specific interest of
its own, and the proceedings had to continue on behalf of the three market-
40
gardeners. This classical method is of course still available today .
A third observation is that any representativity requirement for 
admissibility constitutes a dangerous threshold. In some countries this 
demand is translated into permits from the government: appointment by 
them as the spokesman for a collective interest. Where collective actions are 
often directed against the authorities, this sort of permission acts like a 
muzzle, tending to hold back control over actions by the authorities. From 
the viewpoint of procedural law too there is an objection, namely unwield­
iness. How is the representativity of the Sittard section of the Dutch Society
for the Protection of Animals to be assessed when it comes to securing a ban
41
on folkloristic maltreatment of geese ? And to what extent can foundations 
be thought of in terms of representativity?
A further big problem arises when the representativity requirement is 
considered in its consequences for international proceedings regarding
See Rechtbank Rotterdam, 8 January 1979, Nederlandse furisprudentie 1979, 113, note by 
J.C. Schultsz, Ars Acqui 1980, p. 788, note by d'Oliveira. For an English translation of this 
decision and comments, see: Neth. Yearbook of International Law 1980, pp. 326-333.





























































































be regarded as representative in the Netherlands (subsidized by central,
regional and local authorities and accepted as an interlocutor by the
Ministries and Ministers concerned), but is it also representative as regards
the whole Rhine catchment area, even where action is taken in third
countries? Does an international procedure have to be arrived at for
recognition of representativity characteristics as determined by national 
42
judges or authorities ?
The link between standing in civilibus and art. 79 of the General 
Environmental Principles Act in the international context cannot but be 
weakened. When it comes to licensing procedures in other countries, the 
status of public interest groups is not derived from Dutch law, but from the 
foreign administrative law concerned.
In the meantime, the case law has come to follow the general principles of 
the Hoge Raad's ruling as regards environment protection. Other areas than 
the environment are also eligible for grouping of interests in civil pro­
ceedings, such as for instance the combatting of (race) discrimination.
43
In the Sopar case the Middelburg President stated simply:
"Reinwater cs can be admitted with their claims, as it is undisputed 
that their objectives as described in their bye-laws and their factual 
activities offer sufficient basis for their admission;"
It seems as if in the case law following the landmark Nieuwe Meer decision 
judges have become used to awarding standing to collective interest groups 
in environmental cases and do so without much ado; it must be noted, how-
42
See below, par. 4.2.2.
43
See text with note 15 (3.1.2.b).




























































































ever, that contrary to the Nieuwe Meer-ruling the Middelburg Court 
President seems to enquire into 'factual activities' of the organisations 
concerned. If the showing of these activities amounts to a condition to be 
fulfilled, the President is still less liberal than the Hoge Raad.
4.2. Legislation in progress
Although, or because, group defence of interests has acquired an
increasingly firmer place in the case law and literature in the Netherlands,
the legislator has also been concerned with the more general aspects. This
has led - for the time being - to two different bills, one of which has since
44
come into force: the Act on Equal Treatment of Men and Women .
45
Art. 20a of this Act is the forerunner in a sub-area of the preliminary Draft 
of art. 3(1 l)8a of the new Dutch Civil Code, which covers a broader area. It 
is questionable whether incorporation into the Act of this power of action, 
with the outlines given, is quite so successful. Though developments that 
are just beginning are perhaps not entirely being stopped in their tracks, 
they are held back for the foreseeable future. The advantage of a statutory 
basis is purchased at the expense of the curtailment of existing possibilities 
as explored by the judiciary. This legislative activity has its influence also in 
other areas of group actions than that of sexual equality.
44
Stbl. 1980,86, as amended by Act of 27 April 1989, Stbl. 1989, 168.
45
Art. 20a: 1. Legal persons with full legal capacity that have the objective of promoting 
the interests of those who might appeal to the provisions of art. 1637 ij of the Civil Code 
and the provisions of this Act may in law demand that conduct in conflict with those 
provisions be declared unlawful, prohibited or made the object of an order to undo the 
consequences of the conduct.




























































































4.2.1. The Preliminary Draft on Rights of Claim for Interest Organizations 
In 1989, to implement a motion accepted by the Tweede Kamer (Lower 
House of Parliament) asking the Government to regulate the right of action 
by consumer organizations statutorily, a preliminary draft was published, 
which is now going the rounds of advice agencies and is also being 
commented on in the media.
It is no coincidence that this preliminary draft strongly resembles the 
provision just mentioned of the Equal Treatment Act:
"A legal person with full legal capacity which in accordance with its 
statutes promotes interests of others can, should protection of these 
interests justify this, ask at law for conduct to be declared unlawful 
or for unlawful conduct to be prohibited."
This provision of the preliminary draft, which is ultimately to enter the New
Civil Code as art. 3(ll)(8a), goes further than the motion asked, so as to
allow other than consumer organisations also to gain access to the judge in 
46
this way . In other respects the formulation does not testify primarily to a 
need for bold advance beyond developments in the case law; on the 
contrary, the object is clearly to check these as quickly as possible and if 
possible push them back. This can be shown on the basis of a number of
On the preliminary draft see inter alia M.B.W. Biesheuvel et al., Verdediging van collectieve 
belangen via de rechter (1988), published on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
Jonge Balie bij de Hoge Raad, discussed in inter alia D.W.J.M. Pessers, Behartiging van 
collectieve belangen, Nederlands Juristenblad 1988, pp. 605-607. See also: K. Rozemond, 
Het Voorontwerp Vorderingsrecht belangenorganisaties, Rechtshulp 1989, no. 4, pp. 8- 
19; D. van der Meijden and M. Robesin, Nederlands Juristenblad 1989, pp. 855-856, and 
Th. Drupsteen, Milieu en Recht 1989, p. 345; N. Frenk, Het Voorontwerp 
Vorderingsrecht belangenorganisaties nader geanalyseerd, R.M. Themis-8 (1989), p. 
372-389, idem, Het vorderingsrecht voor belangenorganisaties, Ts. voor consumentenrecht 
1990(3), pp. 203-217, idem, Kollektieve akties in Consumentenzaken, Jaarboek 
consumentenrecht 1990, pp. 321-327; W.C.L. van der Grinten, Vorderingsrecht 
belangenorganisaties; collectieve acties, De Naamlooze Vennoolschap 1990, pp. 172-174; 
Frenk-Messer, Ongekende mogelijkheden voor milieuorganisaties!?, Kwartaalbericht 




























































































aspects in the provision.
In the first place, the provision is construed as an exception to a general 
principle, namely the maxim embodied in Art. 3(H)(8) of the New Civil 
Code that "without an adequate interest, no-one has a legal claim.” This 
'point d'intérêt point d'action' principle, while a very old one, has not 
necessarily acquired a fixed meaning from its age: the 'interest requirement' 
is open to evolution from individual to (also) collective interest, from mate­
rial and economic interest to ideal or moral interest, and even the concept of 
"economic" interest is open to new contents: thus, over recent decades the 
contrast between economy and ecology has fallen away, and ecological 
interest has become an element in the welfare economy, and has acquired 
constitutional status. In this way, the relationship between Arts. 3(H)(8) and 
3(ll)(8a) of the New Civil Code - construed as principle and exception - 
becomes highly problematical.
It is unclear in another respect too. As described above, the General 
Environmental Provisions Act (Art. 79) states that
"... in respect of private law organisations, the interests for which 
they have been called into being shall be regarded as their 
interests."
These interests are thus these organisations' ow n interests, so that complaint
and appeal are open in respect of them in procedures for granting
permission. But Art. 3(ll)(8a) of the New Civil Code construes the same
47
interest as the interest of others Democratic participation in 
47
The draftsman of the provision takes the diametrically opposite position: according to 
his idea, the preliminary draft removes "the fiction of own interest” (cited by Pessers, op. 
cit., p. 606). Ought fictions to be removed in the case of such legal persons as the co. ltd. 
or pic. too, then? Is it the interest of the legal person as such to engage in gainful 




























































































administrative law seems in private law to be perceived as meddling. This 
cognitive dissonance is in conflict with the link that the Hoge Raad has 
made in the Nieuwe Meer ruling between administrative and civil law 
powers. If everybody's interests are at stake, why then are the interests of 
the organization whose aim it is to aggregate these interests not touched? 
Does a legal person not form part of ’everybody'?
One not very important, although characteristic, restriction is the demand 
that organisations must be a "legal person with full legal capacity”.
The construction serves one further purpose: to push back general interest 
actions. Obviously, there is a smooth transition from actions on behalf of 
smaller or bigger groups to actions on behalf of the intangible general in­
terest. Many actions on one's own behalf at the same time serve the 
community. But the tendency in the preliminary draft is clear: organisations 
ought better not to be directed at promoting general interests, for then they 
get in the way of the authorities (whether these do nothing or engage in 
wrongful activities). A step backward in the direction of the 19th century. 
Furthermore, action may be taken only against "unlawful" conduct, which 
excludes, for instance, action in the sphere of law of contract. This is 
connected partly with the fact that Art. 6.5.2.A.6 of the New Dutch Civil 
Code provides regulations for action by interest organisations against
provisions in general conditions that may be regarded as unreasonably 
48
burdensome . In my view there is still a big gap to be closed between this
shareholders who act through the legal person?
48
Cf. Rozemond, loc. cit., p. 12 ff. See also the ruling by the Hague Tribunal, 15 February 
1989, Rechtshulp 1989, no. 4, in which the Consumer Association was denied standing in 
a contractual matter, because this grouping of interests would encroach on the powers 
of the contracting parties concerned (millions of telephone subscribers), to decide 





























































































limited right of claim in Art. 6.5.2.A.6 of the New Dutch Civil Code and the 
right of claim for interest organisations to be allowed by Art. 3(ll)(8a) of the 
New Dutch Civil Code. Moreover, this restriction to the law of tort fails to 
recognize the development in legal theory which tends to link law of 
contract and law of tort closer together under the common denominator of 
law of obligations, in which misperformance too constitutes a tort. The clock 
is being turned back.
"If protection of these interests justifies this." This is a question of legal 
policy, the answer to which is clearly being left up to case law. As such, the 
formulation is nothing more than a bag of wind, signalling that the 
legislator too is powerless and can play little more than a ritual part.
A number of problems with working out group actions in practice, which 
could have been solved very well through legislation, have instead got 
bogged down, or rather, simply been denied.
One important problem is the significance that a legal ruling as to a claim by 
an interest organisation has for interested third parties: the extent of res 
iudicata. According to the preliminary draft an organisation, and this is 
again an important restriction, can only secure a declaratory that particular 
conduct is unlawful, or ask for a judicial injunction; the latter is important, 
since here the road to the judge in summary proceedings remains open. In 
summary proceedings a penal sum ("astreinte" or "dwangsom") can be 
imposed to back up the injunction; breaches make the penal sum claimable 
by and for the plaintiff. But the demand for compensation is excluded. 
Accordingly, the idea must be that the organisation that interests itself in the 
interests of third parties, "others", cannot suffer any damage of its own. But 




























































































judicial ruling on claims by an organisation even outside the interlocutory 
action. This is however not formally the case according to the preliminary 
draft. On the other hand, an organisation may well in fact suffer damage 
from the unlawful deed, namely in the form of costs incurred in preventing 
or combatting it. When, for instance in connection with an environmental 
disaster caused by unlawful deposits or emissions, an environment club 
incurs all sorts of extra costs to reduce the effect of the environmental 
disaster or exploit it in public opinion to prevent new catastrophes, these are 
extra expenditures of the club itself, which are therefore eligible for 
compensation insofar as they have been incurred within the context of its 
objectives.
The same applies to the cost of the litigation itself. In the Netherlands there 
are large numbers of organisations maintained in whole or in part by the 
authorities, on the idea or ideology that they can make an important contri­
bution to participatory democracy or decision-making. Examples are the 
Landelijk Buro Racismebestrijding [National Office to Combat Racism] or 
the Reinwater Foundation. Such organisations regularly encounter the au­
thorities, sometimes as discussion partners, sometimes as scapegoats, 
sometimes as providers of subsidies. If the authorities, then, believe that 
combatting abuses on the one hand, and the quality of public decision­
making on the other, are served by maintaining independent organisations, 
then it is hard to see why these cannot either demand compensation or also
be subsidized from general funds made available to those without adequate
49
means seeking justice: legal aid .
49
So-called State-financed legal aid. See my report on this (1983), loc. cit., p. 182 ff. In this 
respect it should be noted that the authorities, both local and central, have taken heart 
from the outcome of the litigation against the pollution from the French potassium 




























































































The explanatory memorandum, referring to the fact that traditionally a 
judicial decision has effect only between the parties, rejects any effect for 
interested third parties. We already saw that this principle shows exceptions 
at various points, particularly as regards squatters to be evicted. Here too 
there is every reason, if only with a view to more effective protection of 
rights, to attribute more legal importance to a declaration of unlawfulness or 
a prohibition. The preliminary draft curtails the effect that actions by 
interest organisations have for third parties by on the one hand referring to 
a principle (res iudicata) which is already under pressure, and on the other 
limits the possibilities of action by referring to the procedural position of 
third parties, thereby managing to combine the worst of two worlds.
Van der Grinten has attacked the text of the preliminary draft because he 
considers it as an inadequate reaction upon unsavoury developments:
"Promoting the general interest is the task of government, not of 
private organisations (...) I doubt to the extreme whether it is a 
felicitous development to grant organisations which assume the 
objective of promoting the general interest standing in civil courts.
The organisation sets itself up in this way as would-be government 
(...). People who are injured seriously unlawfully in their rights and 
interests, have sufficiently passable legal ways to oppose injustice."
It may be clear from the foregoing that I do not share these individualistic 
and conservative points of view. Nevertheless, for opposite reasons, I share 
his conclusion: "A statutory regulation could be preferred above the present 
unwritten law because it could serve legal security. The present preliminary 
draft does not serve this purpose. (...) This is a matter that can be left to the
polluters. The government here is clearly acting as a "free rider" on public interest 
litigation, started by a small foundation. It would seem perfectly logical, then, for the 
State to allow state-financed legal aid in this area, or to subsidize the bodies involved to 




























































































legal development in the courts.”
Until the present day the government has not seen fit to present a revised
Bill on the basis of the comments received. For different reasons nearly the
whole political spectrum has demonstrated grave doubts — of course, for
50
radically opposed reasons, and legal literature reflects these misgivings .
4.2.2. EEC
On 15 September 1989, the Commission of the EC launched a proposal for a
51
council directive on civil liability  for dam age caused by w aste
This proposal is in various respects particularly interesting for the theme of 
group actions for collective interests. In the first place, environmental 
damage as such is taken into consideration. "Injury to the environment" is 
defined in art. 2(d) as: "a significant and persistent interference in the 
environment caused by a modification of the physical, chemical or 
biological conditions of water, soil and/or air insofar as these are not 
considered to be damaged within the meaning of sub-paragraph c), ii", i.e.,
See, e.g., van Buuren-Betlem-Ijlstra, Milieurecht in stelling (1990) passim, esp. Braams- 
Grosheide-Messer, Handhaving door algemente belangbehartigers via het milieu- 
aaansprakelijkheidsrecht. The proposal of the authors to find inspiration in copyright law 
and more specifically the introduction of a private organisation endowed by statute 
with specific monopolistic powers, must be rejected. It is extremely doubtful that there 
exists such a thing as a "common interest" of environmental organisations which could 
be safeguarded by such a (federative) caretaker. Furthermore, it introduces compliance 
with a condition of representativity which in itself is very dangerous indeed in these 
(and other) fields. In the same vein Frenk-Messer, l.c. (note 46), p. 15, who take a less 
dim view of the possibilities of the proposed legislation.
Com (89)282 final-SYN.217. See on this proposed Directive C. de Villeneuve, La 
responsabilité civile pour les dommages causés par les déchets, in Ministero 
dell'Ambiente (ed.), Atti, 1° Forum intemazionale "Valutazione del Danno ambientale", 




























































































damage to property. Civil liability of the 'producer' is engaged for this 
injury to the environment, as it is for damage to persons and property (art. 
3). For the topic which is under discussion here art. 4(4) is of great 
importance. It states:
"Where the law in Member States gives common-interest groups the 
right to bring an action as plaintiff, they may seek only the 
prohibition or cessation of the act giving rise to the injury to the 
environment. If, however, they have taken the measures provided 
for in paragraph f (b), and (d), they may seek reimbursement of the 
expenditure resulting from such measures."
The explanatory memorandum (under 7) gives the following commentary to
this provision:
7. Parties entitled to institute proceedings
In the first instance, the right to institute liability proceedings 
against the person causing the damage lies with the victim or his 
heirs.
Concerning injuries to the environment, given the fact that those 
concern society, this right is given to the public authorities. This 
right may also be granted to special-interest groups or established, 
recognized associations whose corporate goal is to protect the 
environment or public health. For such groups, the Directive 
introduces a system that takes account of the law applicable in the 
Member States, some of which grant a direct right to proceed to 
such associations (Netherlands, Luxembourg) or, as in the case of 
France and Italy, permit them under certain conditions to institute 
civil proceedings joined to a criminal action or, finally, who remain 
virtually closed to such initiatives.
The Directive is not designed to harmonize practices in this field. 
The Community has chosen an intermediate solution which consists 
in neither opposing current developments, nor precipitating po­
tential developments. The same reasoning has been applied to the 
question of public bodies' right to sue.
Art. 4(4) is a failure in that it has not succeeded in unification or





























































































harmonization of rules concerning locus standi of public interest
organisations. It refers to the law of the Member States as it stands or may
develop, and does not exercise any direct pressure on those Member States
which have not yet introduced possibilities for group actions in the area of
environmental pollution. This same criticism has been raised by ECOSOC in 
53
its Opinion . Nevertheless, one may expect that these countries, which 
have not yet introduced into their law locus standi for group action, are not 
at all immune against events occurring in their territory. By resorting to so­
phisticated forum shopping, action groups can confront those Member 
States with suits that are not allowed within their territory, and this may 
eventually weaken resistance against introducing locus standi for public 
interest groups. This is, for example, precisely what has been done in the
Sopar case, given the fact that in Belgium these groups are considered not to
54
have a personal and direct interest at stake .
As to the question who is entitled to take care of the environment, it is 
interesting to note, that public authorities and common-interest groups are 
juxtaposed in this text (art. 4(3 and 4)) which clearly shows the loss of 
monopoly of the government to serve the public interest as it thinks fit and 
that it now has to suffer possibly different views or other priorities, even 
against itself by aggregation of citizens.
Recently the European Parliament has voted amendments to the proposed
Opinion Ecosoc (90/C 112/08) dd. 28.2.1990, OJ C112/23-25 dd. 7.5.1990, under 7.3. Cf. 
Water Law, July 1990, p. 33.
54
See, e.g., Bocken, De bevoegdheid van milieuverenigingen tot het instellen van 
burgerrechtelijke vorderingen tot sanktionering van de verstoringen van het leefmilieu, 
TAR, 5,1973, pp. 235-243; Bocken-De Meulenaere, The Defense of Collective Interests in 
the Belgian Civil Procedure, Belgian Reports for the Ilnd World Congress of Procedural Law, 




























































































directive . A whole range of bold amendments have been forwarded, most 
of them improvements, and stepping forward where the Commission feared 
to tread.
The amendment for the text of art. 4(4) reads:
"4. Common interest groups or associations, which have as their 
object the protection of nature and environment, shall have the right 
either to bring legal proceedings to seek any remedy under para­
graph 1(b) or to join in legal proceedings that have already been 
brought. However, in order to avoid a proliferation of litigation, 
Member States may limit the number of such groups or associations 
by authorizing, at national, regional or municipal level, only certain 
groups or associations to exercise the right provided for under this 
paragraph."
This amendment is a considerable improvement as it grants a com m unity 
righ t of access to the courts, both in internal and in international cases to 
common interest groups in the field. Although I am not satisfied that there 
is much necessity for streamlining this access to organisations recognized by 
national authorities, this would be in line i\ ith, e.g., French and Italian law 
and represents the present state of affairs in several countries. Another 
spectacular improvement is the lifting of the ban on certain remedies to be 
asked for by common interest groups. What the exact impact is of the right 
to join in legal proceedings remains to be seen; I would have thought that 
the general granting of standing would include the right to join pending 
proceedings and that, in the substance of the matter nothing will be changed 
by including joinder explicitly in the text of the directive. One may wonder 
which amendments will be integrated into the Commission's new
EP Minutes of the proceedings of the sitting of 22 November 1990. Cf. Frenk-Messer, l.c. 






























































































The Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste is an emissary in
the troubled land of civil liability for damage to the environment. In the
aftermath of the Sandoz disaster, the Council asked the Commission in a
resolution of 24 November 1986 to examine the problems posed by the
damage to the environment and to review existing Community preventive
and remedial measures. The Commission is still "preparing a
communication to Council and Parliament which examines the problem
related to the introduction of a system of civil liability for damage to the 
57
environment.” After five years the communication has not yet seen the 
light but the proposed directive might be seen as a reconnoitery manoeuvre.
4.2.3. Council of Europe
In the meantime the Council of Europe, already regularly active in the field
of the environment, has drafted a more general D raft C onven tion  on
58
D am age R esulting  from Activities D angerous to the E nvironm ent
Concerning locus standi, this interesting text contains in art. 20 a provision on 
action by organisations. It states
56
See for the procedure art. 149 EC Treaty.
57
Explanatory Memorandum under (1) to the proposal for a Council Directive on civil 
liability for damage cause by waste. In its amendment the European Parliament 
introduced a new plea in the preliminary considerations: "Whereas there is still a vital 
need for a draft General Directive on civil liability for damage to the environment, due 
to the absence of centralized standards and the incomplete regulations in this field;"
58
Strasbourg, 23 January 1991, Dir/Jur (91)1. This draft has been prepared by the 
Committee of Experts on Compensation for damage caused to the environment and has 
been published to take account of any views expressed when preparing the final text, 
which then has to be examined by the CDCJ and finally submitted to the Committee of 





























































































Article 20 (Action by organisations)
1. Any association or foundation which according to its statutes takes 
care of the protection of the environment and which complies with 
any further conditions of national law of the State Party where the 
action is brought is entitled to bring an action in court or before a 
competent administrative authority
requesting
a. a prohibition of a dangerous activity which is unlawful and poses a 
grave threat of damage to the environment; or
b. an order to the operator to take measures to prevent an incident or 
damage; or
c. an order to the operator to reinstate or clean up the damaged 
environment.
2. National law may stipulate cases where the action is inadmissible.
3. Before deciding upon a request mentioned under paragraph 1 the 
court may, in view of the general interests involved, hear the 
competent public authorities with respect to the measures 
requested.
4. When the national law of a Contracting State referred to in 
paragraph 1 requires that the association or foundation has its 
registered seat or the effective centre of its activities in that State, 
such State may declare at the time of signature, ratification or 
accession that an association or foundation having its seat or centre 
of activities in another State Party and complying in that other State 
with the other conditions mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall have the right to take action in accordance with paragraphs 1 
and 2. The associations or foundations having their seat or centre of 
activities in a State Party which has made such declaration will have 
the same right in any other State which has made the same declara­
tion.
The draft has tried to find a solution for the problem which the EC-directive 
in its original version left unresolved: recognition of locus standi of foreign 
legal persons in countries that require those bodies to have their seat there. 




























































































State where the action is brought allows in its municipal law for standing 
for organisations which are registered in that State or have there the 
effective centre of their activities. In that case such a state may declare itself 
prepared to grant standing to organisations having their seat or centre of 
activities in another State Party if this organisation is entitled in that State, 
according to art. 20 s. 1, to bring actions. Between States which have made 
this declaration standing of each other's environmental organisations shall 
be reciprocal. Thus, Greenpeace Belgium may be granted standing in the 
Netherlands where Greenpeace Belgium would have standing anyhow, 
only if the Netherlands make the declaration to this effect. The machinery 
looks somewhat heavy, and is indicative of the fundamental constitutional 
issues involved in granting standing to private bodies in areas which in 
19th-century thinking are reserved for public authorities.
Another interesting feature is enshrined in art. 20(3), where "in view of the 
general interests involved" the competent public authorities may be heard 
by the court with respect to the measures which are requested. What if the 
competent public authorities are the "persons" who operate the dangerous 
activity? May the state be allowed to appear in two capacities: one as 
defendant and the other as amicus curiae?
5. The applicable law
In this report the present state of Dutch private international law concerning 
transfrontier environmental pollution can only briefly be summarized. We 
assume here, that it forms part of the private international law of tort, for 




























































































this area develops on the basis of case law and legal literature, in open
59
communication with trends in other countries .
Two characteristics are prominent in the development of international tort
law, here as elsewhere: demecanization of the conflict rules involved, and
favorization or protection of victims of pollution. The structure of Dutch
60
conflict rules on environmental torts can be described as follows :
5.1. a. First and foremost it is party  autonom y which governs the
indication of the applicable law. Parties may agree upon the application of a
municipal system of law. Normally, this choice of law by the parties will
take place after the event, i.e., after the occurrence or the start of activities
61
which form the object of the suit . In the Reinwater case which forms the 
clearest example of party choice of law being accepted by the Dutch courts, 
the Dutch plaintiffs had opted for application of Dutch law, and the French
defendant had agreed with this choice in its pleadings before the Rotterdam
62
District Court. In an interlocutory judgment , the court considered that the 
choice of law retroactively agreed upon by the parties for Dutch law could 
be accepted. The Hague Court of Appeal agreed, "as there are no objections"
See recently, e.g., T. Ballarino, Questions de droit international privé et dommages 
catastrophiques, Rcc. des Cours tome 220 (1990-1), pp. 293-387.
60
See generally Drion-de Boer, loose leaf Onrechtmatige daad (Torts) 111c.
61
Cf. W. Snijders, Subsequent choice of law and compromissory Agreement 
(Vaststellingsovereenkomst), T.M.C. Asser Instituut (ed.), Essays on international and 
comparative law in honour of Judge Erodes (1983), p. 134-142.





























































































(to be raised against it) . Against this element of the judgment no cassation
proceedings were instituted; the Hoge Raad in its summing up of the
background of these proceedings only mentioned that Dutch law was ap- 
64
plicable .
In this case Dutch law was both lex fori and lex damni. Parties may have the 
most diverse and exotic reasons to agree upon the application of a certain 
system of law. In the case at hand the French defendant accepted application 
of Dutch law, as it would gain a tier of jurisdiction by that choice: in
cassation violation of foreign (e.g. French) law cannot be attacked (by
65
anything else than complaints about lack of reasoning) .
5.2. b. In case parties do not make use of their autonomy, the judge falls 
back upon an objective connecting factor. According to a tradition which
just goes back, in the Netherlands, to the second half of this century, the
66
applicable law is found through the lex loci delicti rule , except if there is a 
closer connection with another country. Just as in the area of jurisdiction on 
the basis of the place of the harmful event the problem of Distanzdelikte — 





Court of Appeal the Hague, 10 September 1986. Environmental Liability Law Review 1981, 
1, p. 15, note van der Meer, ibidem 1988,2, pp. 33-43, note van Dunné.
Hoge Raad, 23 September 1988, NJ 1989, notes J.H. Nieuwenhuis and J.C. Schultsz, 
Environmental Liability Law Review 1989, pp. 12-30, note van Dunné.
Cf. d’Oliveira, De antikiesregel (diss., 1971), pp. 117-175; idem, Foreign law and legal 
cooperation, Haguc-Zagrcb-Essays 2 (1978), pp. 216-240.
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See, e.g., Dubbink, De onrechtmatige daad in het nederlandse internationale privaatrecht, doct. 
thesis 1947; Th.M. de Boer, Beyond lex loci delicti? Conflicts Methodology and Multistate 
Torts in American Case Law, doct. thesis 1987, and the literature mentioned in
2




























































































even always the case that the physical place of acting and the place of the
damage do not coincide. The internationality of the case may also be
constituted by the different identity in terms of nationality or domicile of the
parties involved. One example is the Bhopal disaster in India, where the
American subsidiary (Union Carbide) of an American corporation operated
a chemical plant, which affected the neighbouring local population in such a 
67
devastating way . Piercing the corporate veil may play a role here in iden­
tifying the place which can be deemed the place where the negligence was 
born.
If locus actus and locus damni are to be localized in different countries, then it
is not clear beyond doubt what the situation according to Dutch p.i.l. is.
Some writers are of the opinion that in this situation it is for the judge to
decide whether to apply the law of the place where the damaging activities
are located, or the law of the place of the damage, presumably (n view of
choosing the most favourable law. Others, however, take the stand that in
this case of plurality of places of the tort the switch has to be made towards
the law of the place of the victim (plaintiff) — which coincides in most cases
with the locus damni — with the proviso that defendant must have foreseen
that the effects of his activities would make themselves felt there, and under
68
the assumption that there is no law more closely connected .
Again there is the position (taken by the author) that it is not for the judge,
but for the plaintiff-victim to determine the locus of the transboundary
69
pollution and thus to indicate the applicable law . What this boils down to
67
See e.g., Zilioli, II caso Bhopal, Riv. giur. dell'ambiente 1987,2.
68
De Boer, Alternatieven voor de lex loci delicti, Offerhauskring 1982, Comp, van Rooij- 
Polak, Private International Law (1987), p. 138.





























































































is a unilateral choice of law by one of the parties, which seems justified by
the guiding principle of protection of weaker parties and parties which
serve weaker interests. At the same time this choice allows for optimal-
ization of both preventive and compensatory measures. Developments in
other countries lend support to this point of view.
70
In the Benckiser case the Hoge Raad had occasion to explain itself on the 
applicable law as far as the alleged tort of Benckiser, the German firm, was 
concerned. The Dutch Supreme Court stated
4.7. (...) The complaint (...) that the Court of Appeal had to apply 
not Dutch but German law to the alleged tort must be rejected as 
well. The facts which the Court of Appeal took as the basis for its 
decision imply that Benckiser has acted unlawfully as accomplice 
to the torts of X (the director of Bos) and Bos Bouwstoffen, and that 
the activities of which Benckiser is accused, although taking place 
predominantly in Germany, have found their finality in the 
Netherlands in that the situation of which the termination is 
demanded in this case has been brought about here.
Under these circumstances the Court of Appeal has rightly judged 
Benckiser's tortious behaviour according to Dutch law."
Here we have the case of three parties who were acting together, but in 
different countries and bringing about soil pollution in several places in the 
Netherlands. One of the defendants has even been condemned in a criminal 
trial for his part. It is not completely clear what the significance is of the
Rijnvervuiling en internationaal privaatrecht, Milieu en Recht 1989, p. 146 ff.; idem, Le 
bassin du Rhin, sa pollution et le droit international privé, in La réparation des dommages 
catastrophiques. Les risques technologiques majeurs en droit international et en droit 
communautaire, Travaux des Xlllèmes Journées d'études juridiques Jean Dabin (1990), 
pp. 157-181 at p. 166 ff.





























































































Hoge Raad's reasoning . It has characteristics of what could be called 
dependent localization (accessoire aanknoping). The tort perpetrated by 
Benckiser is so intimately connected with the torts committed by the Dutch 
defendants that it is only fair (and expedient) to assess it according to the 
same law as is applied to the other defendants. As they acted in the 
Netherlands and the effect of their activities lay there, Dutch law applies to 
their illegal acts and this is decisive for the application of Dutch law also on 
Benckiser's role.
On the other hand the Hoge Raad talks the language of locus damni.
Benckiser's activities have found their completion in the Netherlands, and
redress is sought to change a factual situation in the Netherlands.
Puzzling is the fact that the Hoge Raad states that the Court of Appeal has
rightly applied Dutch law. Under the assumption that the Court of Appeal
could have chosen freely between locus actus and locus damni the apter
phrase would have been: "the Court of Appeal could without violation of
the law apply Dutch law under the circumstances mentioned". Unless one
tries to read too much in this decision, and unless the Hoge Raad is choosing
without much ado for the locus damni in transboundary cases (like the
French Cour de Cassation), the tentative conclusion would be that this is a 
72
dependent localization case .
Whether this is the right perspective is another matter. Benckiser's activities
Both the President in summary proceedings and the Court of Appeal seem to have 
applied the antikies-rcgel, emphasizing the fact that Benckiser’s activities were illegal 
according to both Dutch and German law, or primarily according to Dutch law but at 
all events also according to German law.
See also the conclusions of Advocat-Cénéral Asser who mentions these two options. In 
his note Schultsz reaches the conclusion that it is the participation in one set of facts 





























































































have been decisive for what the Dutch defendants did: the German firm 
offered the opportunity, and wanted too badly to get rid of its poisonous 
waste, wherever, that it should be considered as the protagonist in the 
matter, who acted primarily in Germany. If there is dependent localization, 
then the other way round: the Dutch defendants could have been treated ac­
cording to German law; unless one reaches the conclusion that Benckiser, 
under locus damni rule has to be judged according to Dutch law, and that 
this is decisive also for the Dutch defendants.
In the Sopar case the President clearly applied the Dutch municipal law of 
torts, without however explicitly stating as much. He concentrated on the 
acceptability of issuing the requested injunctions against a dimly discernible 
background of Dutch law of torts where, however, the silhouettes of Dutch 
and Belgian administrative law loomed as sketchy protagonists in the play. 
Parallelism between forum and ius, especially in the summary proceedings, 
may have driven the president to omitting a consideration on the applicable 
law, once he had established his jurisdiction.
5.3. c. The lex loci delicti as connecting principle retreats before stronger 
ind ica tions that another law is more adequate. It is difficult to speculate in 
which types of cases this loose device may clinch the applicable law. One 
could think of piercing-the-veil situations, as in the Bhopal case, where 
foreign parent companies are pulling the strings of sloppy daughter 
companies. We have seen that in Benckiser complicity in the evil doings of 
others may entail being judged according to the same law, if some other 
elements are present as well. Other forms of amalgamation are known in 




























































































relationship . In these cases sometimes the common nationality or domicile 
of the parties is taken to play a determining role. In this connection I would 
like to add that in the context of the EEC it is doubtful if it is at all allowed 
to use (common) nationality as a connecting factor. In view of the principle 
of non-discrimination within the ambit of the EC Treaty, laid down in art. 7 
of the said Treaty, and under the assumption that most tort cases represent 
subject matter which is envisaged by the Treaty, nationality as connecting 
factor for the applicable law or as basis for remedial devices is suspect. 
Thus, art. 38 of the EGBGB after the recent codification of German private 
international law, which contains a provision protecting persons of German 
nationality, is contrary to this non-discrimination principle. Here the
German public policy has to give precedence to the European public policy.
, 74In European law there is no place for lnlanderschutzklausel .
6. Recognition and enforcement
More systematico a word or two on recognition and enforcement would be in
place in this stage. As the author is somewhat pressed for time, he will not
put in this word, and refer for this topic to the general textbooks and other
75
earlier writings, primarily concerned with the EEX , and the Parallel
See Strikwerda, l.c., nr. 182 for some examples. See also d'Oliveira, Internationale 
Verkeersongelukken (1965), p. 19, and Drion-de Boer, o.c., nr. 74 ff.
74
In the opposite sense: Rossbach, NJW 1988, p. 591.
Cf. Vlas in: van der Dungen, loose leaf commenting on the EEX ad Ch. Ill; Kropholler,
2
Europaisches Zivilprozessrecht (1987) ; Gothot-Holleaux, La Convention de Bruxelles du 




























































































Convention of Lugano. In the area of recognition and enforcement 
concerning transboundary pollution, there is no Dutch case law that he is 
aware of; neither case law in other countries on the recognitions of Dutch 
court decisions.
7. Selected issues
In this last paragraph I would like to touch upon some problematic areas of 
transboundary pollution law and on some emerging elements of municipal 
law which are of special interest to this topic.
7.1. Permits
a. With the indication of the applicable law not all problems are 
solved. One issue merits special attention: the existence of permits for the 
activities which lead to the pollution of the environment and which may 
bring damage to property or other interests. The existence of a permit for 
these activities may influence the reaching of a conclusion about the legality 
of the polluting activities. In some countries a permit - within the conditions 
of which the polluting activities take place - make the actor immune for 
claims arising out of these activities, whereas in other countries there is no
Bevoegdheids- en Executieverdrag (1982), deel 2 (1986), deel 3, Erkenning en 
Tenuitvoerlegging van vreemde vonnissen (1989), etc.; see also for questions of private envi­
ronmental law especially the public policy exception of art. 27: d'Oliveira, La pollution 
du Rhin et le i.i.p. (1978), p. 116-117; Kohler, Zivilrechtliche Schadenersatz- und 
Unteriassungsklagen, gerichtliche Zustàndigkeit und Verfahrensgrenze (Recht der 
Europâischen Gemeinschaften), in: Bothe-Prieure-Ress (eds), Rechtsfragen
grenzüberschreitender Umweltbelastungcn (1982), pp. 129-142; d'Oliveira, Le bassin du Rhin, 





























































































such effect. Permits, licences, authorizations and the like vary not only from 
country to country but within one country the same activity may be covered 
by different types of licences. Thus it becomes a common defence in 
international litigation that the polluting activities are covered by a licence 
granted in country A (the country where the activities take place), whereas 
the environmental tort is judged by a court in country B according to the 
municipal law of country B declared applicable by its conflict rules. Some 
questions that may be asked about this situation are the following. Must the 
significance which the permit has under the law of the issuing authority be 
transplanted into the applicable law of the tort? To give an example, will a 
French defendant who acted under a permit in which, according to French 
law, 'les droits des tiers sont réservés', profit from the fact that under the law 
applicable on the transboundary tort, say, German law, the comparable 
permit guarantees against law suits of third parties or not? Does it make a 
difference if the remedy sought is injunctive or pecuniary? Is it a relevant 
aspect that in the procedure leading to the issue of the authorization 
interests of the environment of other countries and their inhabitants have 
been put into the balance?
76
Solutions for these problems are still in a state of flux . There are a few 
decisions which shed light on the matter under Dutch law, in the first place 
the Reinwater case. The Hoge Raad established that the Court of Appeal 
reached the conclusion, and this conclusion could not be attacked in 
cassation, as art. 99 of the Law of the Judiciary Organisation does not allow 
control of foreign law,
76
See, e.g., d'Oliveira, De Rijnsanering in het slop, Nederlands Juristenblad 1980, pp. 85-93; 
Reports (Dutch) Association for Environmental Law 1989-3 (1990), p. 30, p. 43 et seq.; 
Hager, Zur Bcriicksichtigung ôffentlich-rechtlicher Genehmigungen bei Streitigkeiten 




























































































"that the French licence to discharge to which the MDPA conformed 
also in respect of its conditions has not the objective to balance the 
relevant interests in such a way as to immunize the holder of the 
licence against liability in tort. This conclusion is manifestly based 
on the construction of the permit and the reservation therein 
contained concerning the rights of third parties, especially the users 
of the water who experience damage by the chloride discharges, 
such against the background of nature and objectives of the French 
77
legislation concerned;"
Implicit in this rejection of the complaint is, that the licence involved is 
accepted into the Dutch applicable law with its status under French law. (As 
a matter of fact both systems of law allow law suits in tort notwithstanding 
the existence of a licence in situations in which it is not alleged that the 
defendant violated the conditions of the permit.) French administrative law, 
then, is combined with Dutch civil law.
In the Sopar case, the President approached the matter in a slightly different 
way. He seemed to be prepared to take into account statutory norms of both 
Belgium and the Netherlands, and enquired into conditions in permits con­
cerning discharges of PACs in both countries. He stated:
"It does not appear that in Belgium and/or the Netherlands 
observance is required of an enterprise as Sopar's by the authorities 
of a strict norm of 0,1 microgram/liter. In the establishing of an ob­
jective standard to be observed by Sopar, there is no better 
orientation than the norm contained in the discharge permit which 
allows her to discharge up to 30 micrograms/liter of waste water. 
This only more so because it does not appear that this standard 
deviates unfavourably from standards imposed in the Netherlands 
and/or Belgium on comparable enterprises."
But with this statement the case was not yet finished. Although it was not





























































































disputed that Sopar stayed within the conditions of the permits, this left the 
question open if third parties could nevertheless demand compliance with 
stricter norms. It is here that the president's reasoning becomes extremely 
interesting, as he makes a distinction between the position of third parties 
generally and third parties which act for the common or general interest:
"4.6. May private parties, as Reinwater c.s., demand from Sopar that 
it comply with a stricter norm than that which is (usually) required 
by the public authorities? I think it as weighty for the answer to this 
question that Reinwater c.s. are not to be considered as exclusively 
entitled to the interests for which they seek protection through this 
law suit. The (environment of the) canal Ghent-Terneuzen and/or 
the Westerscheldt does not belong to her in this sense. Although this 
does not need to lead to non-admissability of her claims, as said 
above, this position does play a role in defining the extent and 
nature of the care due to her, of the standard which may be applied. 
The question of the lawfulness of a harmful act towards a person 
who has an exclusive entitlement to a property which is damaged 
thereby is not completely answered by referring to the compliance 
with a standard of public law; there is only room for applying 
stricter standards on behalf of those entitled parties, whose interest 
is not or hardly different from the general interest, under ex­
traordinary circumstances.
In this case Reinwater cs stand up only for the interests as just 
indicated, whereas the existence of special circumstances - such as, 
e.g., that the public law standard is not any longer acceptable 
according to the general view of society - has not been made 
sufficiently clear."
Follows the rejection of the claim. The referral to a change in what society 
thinks of the existing norms and standards is intriguing as it does not 
indicate, in this international case, which society the president has in mind. 
Dutch, Belgian or both? EC level? The judge comes near to applying a kind 
of non-choice rule, or a double-barrelled rule concerning the standards 
contained in permits: that they have to comply both with statutory norms in 





























































































b. This brings me to another issue concerning permits. Under
international law it is allowed for states and international organisations to
bind activities elsewhere to municipal rules if these activities have a certain
impact there or show a certain connection with the country or organisation
involved. Extraterritorial legislation in the area of competition law is a
common and accepted phenomenon; the same goes for taxation, criminal
law and many other branches of law. Seen from the stand-point of public
international law there is nothing strange about a situation in which one and
the same activity is (potentially) regulated by norms of two separate systems
of law, e.g., by requiring permits from both countries. Whether this is in fact
the case depends on the interpretation of the legislations involved. In my
opinion the Dutch law concerning the pollution of surface waters (Wet
Verontreiniging Oppervlaktewateren) allows for requiring enterprises based
in other countries to ask for a Dutch licence, whenever they directly or
indirectly discharge polluting substances into Dutch surface waters. If this is
the case, then, as in the Reinwater-MDPA case and in the Sopar case, foreign
enterprises without such licences are already infringing Dutch law as they
are discharging upon Dutch surface waters without Dutch permits. This is a
78
controversial issue. Some authors do not agree at all .
See J.H. Ians, Europees Milieurecht in Nederland (1991), p. 222/223: "Extraterritorial 
application of environmental legislation becomes only problematic when this violates 
the rights of persons derived from the legal system of those other sovereign states. For 
example, when foreign discharging bodies, in the case of transboundary effects in the 
Netherlands, would be considered to be obliged to have a licence according to Dutch 
law as well. (...) Such measures will only take shape on the basis of international 
conventions." For me, it is just the other way around. In the example the Netherlands 
are entitled, under public international law, to require a Dutch authorization from 
foreign-based enterprises if their activities affect Dutch territory. Although the 




























































































7.2. Municipal and substantive law
As we have seen, the European Commission is preparing a communication 
concerning the problems related to the introduction of a system of civil 
liability for damage to the environment. The harmonization of the civil 
liability systems in the Member States of the EC would presumably be based 
on a legal transformation of the economic polluter pays principle. 
Presumably some type of strict liability would be introduced, as in the draft 
Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste. But there are other 
elements which are important for collective action for diffuse interests as 
well.
1 mention two questions:
a. The need for inform ation. In order to successfully engage in 
activities leading to litigation for the protection of the environment, it is vital 
to collect information concerning the polluter and his legal position as 
concerns permits etc. In many countries third parties have no part to play in 
the administrative proceedings leading to the issue of a permit, and in 
others permits are kept secret as sensitive materials or trade secrets. The 
Strasbourg draft Convention on Damage Resulting from Activities dan­
gerous to the Environment, drawing on earlier conventions and resolutions, 
contains a chapter on access to information: both held by public authorities 
and by operators as define in the Convention (arts. 14-18).
Confining myself to the information held by operators, the provisions seem 
to take with the one hand what they give with the other. The person 
suffering damage may request a court to order an operator to provide him
allowed. To streamline this bellum omnium contra omnes one needs international 
conventions in which states etc. agree upon common standards. Cf. the many 





























































































with specific information, insofar as this is necessary to establish a claim
under the Convention, such as the kind and concentration of the dangerous
substances employed or released, etc. (art. 18(1)). Presumably information
about the permit should be asked from the public authorities involved
under art. 15. It is very unfortunate, however, that there is an extensive list
79
of exceptions to the obligations to furnish information , so that it may be 
feared that plaintiffs will stay empty-handed and will have to grope in the 
dark concerning the extent of the polluting activities of the operator. 
Nevertheless, the convention gives an opening - be it a slight one - in this 
important area.
b. Rem edies. There has been a clear tendency not to allow public in­
terest organisations to claim the same remedies as injured private parties. In
the Dutch preliminary draft on Rights of Claim for public interest 
80
organisations does only allow for injunctions but not for recovery of any 
damages.
The proposed Directive is a little bit more liberal. It states (art. 4 (4 and 5)), 
that common interest groups
"may seek only the prohibition or cessation of the act giving rise to 
the injury to the environment. If, however, they have taken the 
measures provided for in par. 1 (b) and (d) they may seek 
reimbursement of the expenditure resulting for such measures."
The measures referred to are those 'to prevent the damage or injury to the
79
I read art. 18(5) as referring to paragraph 2 (not 3) of art. 15, which applies mutatis 
mutandis to access to information held by operators.
80





























































































environment' (par. 4(b)) and 'measures taken for the restoration of the 
environment to its state immediately prior to the occurrence of injury to the 
environment', and expenditure incurred in connection with these measures 
(art. 4(d)).
It will depend on the interpretation of these provisions to which extent
group action may succeed in claiming damages. Is a publicity campaign
urging an enterprise or a group of enterprises to reduce discharges to be
considered as expenditure for the restoration of the environment etc.? And
research that will be used as a basis for such a campaign to rouse public 
81
opinion ? As we have seen, the amendments by the European Parliament 
gives common interest groups much more opportunities in claiming 
remedies. It seems to me that this is an important contribution to a 
development in which the perspective on activities endangering or harming 
the environment will show a strong human rights component, with the im­
plication that litigation to safeguard the environment may be seen as human 
rights litigation with structured adiones populares.
82
In a very recent case the district court of Rotterdam, 15 March 1991 took a 
bold step forward.
Thousands of sea-birds were covered with oil in the wake of an accident 
with a Rumanian bulk carrier, the Borcea, off the Dutch coast. One of the 
oldest Dutch bird protection associations took charge of a saving operation 
together with other environmental organizations: clearing off the birds,
81
Sec the discussion about this topic in Ministero dell’Ambiente, Atti, 1° Forum nazionale 
(footnote 47), pp. 44-46. See about the preliminary draft M. Killerby, ibidem, pp. 33-36.
82
Unpublished, rolno. 7473/89 (Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van 
Vogels/Intreprindera de Exploatara a Floti Maritime Navrom). See Baauw-Frenk, 





























































































housing in asylums for a while and repopulation of the area. The 
organizations involved now bring a suit before the Rotterdam tribunal to 
recover their costs from the Rumanian owner of the ship.
The Court explains its decision to award these damages as follows:
"In view of the purpose and activities which plaintiff has developed 
to realize its aims already for a period of 40 years — this is 
uncontested — this general interest (conservation and protection of 
sea-birds, d'O) must also be seen as an interest of plaintiff; she can 
in a case of violation of her own interests be admitted in a request 
for putting an end to this violation, but also in a claim to 
compensation of the damage she suffered in trying to limit the 
effects of this violation.
It is not clear why she should be entitled to prevent or put an end to 
a violation of her interest but not be entitled to claim the damage 
she has suffered as a consequence of this violation, or to claim from 
the author of this violation the expenses she has had to lay out for 
restriction or prevention of the consequences of this violation."
Again we observe that the general interest involved is considered to be at
the same time the interest of plaintiff, a public interest organization. The
Rotterdam District Court is in line with the above-mentioned Nieuwe Meer 
83
arrest in this respect. But it goes a necessary but bold step further in 
accepting that the author of the tort acts also tortiously as regards the public 
interest organization, with the implication of a duty to pay damages and 
costs, if this organization is acting with discretion within the limits of its 
self-chosen purpose. With this good news I end this report.
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